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Introduction: Tragedy Upon Tragedy
On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the country of Haiti 10 miles
from its capital city, Port-au-Prince, killing an estimated 230,000 people, injuring 300,000, and
displacing another 1.5 million.1 Nearly 105,000 homes were completely leveled, 208,000
severely damaged, along with another 1,300 schools and 50 hospitals. Haiti’s national
government faced the deaths of countless officials and the collapse of the Presidential Palace,
Parliament, courts, and administrative buildings.2 According to the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the earthquake led to infrastructure damages amounting to
120 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product in 2009.3 But the 2010 earthquake was not the
country’s only run-in with disaster this decade. In 2004, and again in 2008, Haiti was ravaged by
a number of tropical storms and hurricanes from which it was still recovering from when the
earthquake struck.
The destruction of lives and property wrought upon Haiti by these series of hydrometeorological disasters began Haiti towards systematically addressing its relationship to risk
through the implementation of various Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) measures. DRR is based
on the notion that disasters are not solely the product of hazards, but a result of the intersection
of human behavior and natural phenomena. Disasters can often be traced to a number of
decisions made, or not made, by human communities in terms of where to live, how to build, and
how to sustain themselves. Because our choices are a vital component in determining our degree
of susceptibility to hazard, proponents of DRR believe that we can make decisions that minimize
vulnerabilities and risks, or limit the negative impacts when disaster does occur. This paper will
1

http://www.usaid.gov/ht/helphaiti.html.
Haiti earthquake PDNA: assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs (p. 5). (2010). Government of
the Republic of Haiti. Retrieved from http://www.refondation.ht/resources/PDNA_Working_Document.pdf.
3
Haiti: from rescue and relief to reconstruction (p. 1). (2001). United States Agency for International Development.
Retrieved from http://www.usaid.gov/ht/docs/eqdocs/usg_factsheets/USG_relief_to_reconstruction.pdf.
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outline how the Haitian government, local and international non-governmental organizations,
major international aid agencies, and donors have sought to make Haitians less vulnerable and
more resilient in the face of disaster. It will assess the DRR measures that were being
implemented in Haiti following the tropical storms and hurricanes of 2004 and 2008; the role the
earthquake has played in augmenting the risks facing Haiti; and the DRR objectives to be
incorporated in the reconstruction and recovery process.

Haiti Under Water
Though the January 12 earthquake is perhaps the single most devastating disaster event
the country has ever faced, Haiti has a much more extensive and equally tragic history dealing
with the effects of hydrometeorological hazards. Located in the midst of Hurricane Alley, a
stretch of warm water running from the western coast of Africa to the eastern shores of Central
America, where hurricanes traditionally form, Haiti is menaced yearly by tropical storms and
hurricanes between the months of May and November. In fact, Haiti has been declared one of the
countries most vulnerable to climate change, with 20 major disasters in the twentieth century,
four in the past decade alone, and 96% of the population facing 2 or more climate-related risks.4
Worse yet, scientists have noted significant increases in the wind speeds and precipitation
intensities of Atlantic hurricanes over the past three decades as a result of rising ocean
temperatures, predicting more destructive storms in the future as climate change persists.5
Though the 2010 earthquake is at the top of the list of disasters in terms of the number of people

4

Haiti Earthquake PDNA, 2001, p. 25.
Haiti: 'a gathering storm'--climate change and poverty (p. 17). (2009). Oxfam International. Retrieved from
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/climate_change/downloads/oi_report_climate_change_haiti_gathering_st
orm_en_301109.pdf.
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affected and the magnitude of economic loss, over the past thirty years, most of Haiti’s suffering
can be directly attributed to major storms and flooding.6

Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (People Affected)
Disaster

Date

Affected

Earthquake*

2010

3,700,000

Storm

1994

1,587,000

Storm

1980

1,165,000

Drought

1992

1,000,000

Storm

1988

870,000

Storm

2004

315,594

Flood

2003

150,000

Storm

2008

125,050

Storm

2007

108,763

Drought

1980

103,000

Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (People Killed)
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Disaster

Date

Killed

Earthquake*

2010

222,570

Epidemic

2010

2,761

Storm

2004

2,754

Flood

2004

2,665

Storm

1994

1,122

Storm

2008

529

Storm

1980

220

Storm

1998

190

Storm

2007

90

Storm

2008

85

Natural Disasters from 1980 -2010. In Haiti Disaster Statistics. Retrieved from Prevention Web
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/index.php?cid=74.
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Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (Economic Damages)
Disaster

Date

Cost (US$ x 1,000)

Earthquake*

2010

8,000,000

Storm

1980

400,000

Storm

1998

180,000

Storm

1988

91,286

Storm

2004

50,000

Storm

2005

50,000

Storm

1994

50,000

Flood

2002

1,000

Storm

2004

1,000

Storm

2005

500

Overview
No of events:
No of people killed:
Average killed per year:
No of people affected:
Average affected per year:

74
233,919
7,546
9,952,766
321,057

Economic Damage (US$ x 1,000):

8,823,906

Economic Damage per year (US$ x
1,000)

284,642

In 2004, and again in 2008, Haiti’s vulnerability to tropical storms became dramatically
exposed. From the 17th through the 18th of September 2004, the torrential rains of tropical storm
Jeanne inundated 80% of Haiti’s third largest city, Gonaïves,7 causing the deaths of 2,326 people
and the destruction of about 5,000 homes,8 leaving nearly 170,000 people without food, water, or

7

Heavy rains cause chaos in Western Haiti. (2004). Oxfam International. Retrieved from ReliefWeb
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/JMAN652HN9?OpenDocument&query=Haiti%20hurricane%20jeanne&cc=hti.
8
Haiti’s clean-up progresses in the Caribbean. (2005). US Agency for International Development. Retrieved from
ReliefWeb http://reliefweb.int/node/165784.
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electricity.9 Before Haiti got a chance to adequately recover from Jeanne’s destruction, four
years later the country was again being wracked by tropical cyclones. On August 15, 2008,
tropical storm Fay began what would become a spate of storms to pass over the country in the
matter of a week or so. After Fay, Haiti successively suffered Hurricane Gustav on August 26,
and hurricanes Hanna and Ike on September 3rd and 7th respectively. Again Gonaïves was left
under water. Aerial assessments discovered inundation up to three meters high in some locations,
nearly 20,000 homes flooded, and the north-south road that connected the city to other parts of
the country entirely impassable, cutting the region off from outside aid for four days.10 When the
wind and rain of Hurricane Ike reached Haiti on September 7, access to the city of Gonaïves was
still largely limited as a result of the floods caused by Hanna.11

First Steps Towards Addressing Risks
Despite the turbulence of 2008, many argued that the Haitian government and the
international community’s efforts following Hurricane Jeanne played a significant role in
reducing the fatal impact of that year’s storm season. In 2004, 5,000 people died out of 300,000
affected, while in 2008, less than 800 died out of a total of 865,000.12 The Haitian government’s
attempts to improve the capacity of its disaster management institutions were strongly supported
by the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World

9

Renois, C. (2004). Haiti confronts new disaster with more than 700 killed in floods. Agence France-Presse (AFP).
Retrieved from ReliefWeb http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SZIE652SDU?OpenDocument&query=Haiti%20hurricane%20jeanne&cc=hti.
10
Flooding trends in Savane Jong, Gonaives/Haiti: Pre- and Post-Hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike (as of 23 Sep
2008). (2008). CATHALAC, SERVIR, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, US Agency for
International Development. Retrieved from ReliefWeb http://reliefweb.int/map/haiti/flooding-trends-savane-jonggonaiveshaiti-pre-and-post-hurricanes-gustav-hanna-and-ike-23.
11
Haiti: Hurricane Season 2008 Revised Emergency Appeal No. MDRHT005. (2008). International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Retrieved from ReliefWeb http://reliefweb.int/node/281807.
12
Disaster Risk Management in Haiti, Summary Note. (2010). Global Facility For Disaster Reduction and
Recovery. Retrieved from http://gfdrr.org/ctrydrmnotes/Summary_Haiti.pdf.
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Bank. In 2004, after Jeanne, the government of Haiti established disaster management as the
purview of the Directorate of Civil Protection with the vision of expanding its role beyond
disaster assistance to include extensive mitigation work.13 The World Bank specifically launched
a three-year US$12 million Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project known by its
French acronym PUGRD. Its primary objectives were to strengthen the Directorate of Civil
Protection (DCP), and to improve coordination within the newly created National Disaster Risk
Management System (NDRMS), a network of departments, municipalities, and committees of
local government officials and civil society representatives responsible for enhancing national
and local capacity in risk assessment, risk reduction, and preparedness.14 It also began
developing the legal framework to establish DRR as a national priority.
Besides developing the institutional framework for disaster risk management, in 2005 the
Haitian government undertook a number of initiatives to better understand the risks facing the
country and to prepare the population to act when disaster was imminent. The government
commissioned the development of a methodology for the design of local flood hazard maps,
from which two pilot maps were produced with the intention of expanding the initiative
throughout the entire country. It also sought to create a database of damages caused by disasters
using the Disaster Inventory System (DESINVENTAR).
Perhaps where Haiti’s NDRMS was most successful following the 2004 hurricane was in
its disaster preparedness and response efforts. Two pilot flood early warning systems were
established in Haiti in support of the design of a National Early Warning System. Radio
programs and posters were utilized throughout the 2005 hurricane season as part of a campaign

13

http://eird.org/country-profiles/profiles/index.php/Haiti#HFA_National_Focal_Point.
Amin, S., & Goldstein, M. (Eds.). (2008). Data against natural disasters: establishing effective systems for relief,
recovery, and reconstruction (pp. 102-103). The World Bank. Retrieved from Prevention Web
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7943_97808213745281.pdf.
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to increase the population’s awareness of the risks associated with storms and flooding. The
DPC, with the support of the United Nations and the U.S. Army Southern Command
(Southcom), developed a National Plan of Action for that year’s hurricane season that included
two simulation exercises and the training of disaster risk management committees in the
development of their own contingency plans.15 The NDRMS specifically prioritized the
strengthening of local capacity for response, a measure to decentralize and make the system
more effective where it was most needed. It put together a network of Disaster Risk Management
committees in all 10 departments and over 110 of the country’s 165 municipalities, involving
nearly 4,000 people throughout the country. The establishment of effective warning protocols
and awareness campaigns has improved evacuation and mobilization efforts, with the number of
people evacuated rising from 6,000 in 2006, 33,000 in 2007, to 122,000 in 2008. This was
clearly evidence of a more effective dissemination of early warning messages and public
responsiveness.16
In 2006, the Haitian government specifically addressed the relationship between its
vulnerability to natural hazards and environmental factors such as ecological degradation and
climate change by declaring the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). In the
decade 1990 to 2000, Haiti lost nearly 44 percent of its forest cover.17 Deforestation along with
increasingly more violent storms has led to the crumbling of hillsides into rivers and lakes,
causing massive mudslides and flooding throughout the country. NAPA focused on developing a
national policy of watershed management. This included the Geographical Information System
(GIS) Project at the Ministry of Planning that mapped land use, erosion, and housing density
15

HFA National Report 2005. (2005). United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Retrieved from
http://eird.org/wikien/images/%28Haiti%29_National_Initiatives_Implementation_HF_2005.pdf.
16
Disaster risk management programs for priority countries (pp. 138-141). (2009). The World Bank. Retrieved from
http://www.gfdrr.org/docs/6thCG_DRM_Programs_for_Priority_Countries.pdf.
17
Haiti—A Gathering Storm, 2009, p. 18.
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throughout the country, the National Policy for Disaster Preparedness established by the Ministry
of Interior, and the Coastal Zone Management Program administered by the Ministry of
Environment. The objective of these initiatives was to address the various climate-related
hazards that plagued Haiti, such as flash flooding, intense rainfall, and tropical storms.18 The
Haitian government’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper published in 2007 went
further by identifying disaster risk reduction as an important component of its development
strategy.19 The strategy called for efforts to address the causes of disaster rather than narrowly
focusing on the management of disasters, identifying poverty as a key element in vulnerability to
disaster, and thus poverty reduction as an important component in reducing risk. It placed
decentralization of development and risk management at the forefront of reducing the prevalence
of disaster throughout the country.
Gonaïves, particularly affected by Jeanne in 2004, received much of the international aid
community’s attention. USAID, whose funds were used in a number of projects around the city,
was significant in improving capacity for disaster risk management at the local level. In 2005,
CARE, one of the major humanitarian organizations receiving USAID funds in Haiti, assisted in
the establishment of 16 disaster committees, and the development of a basic watershed
information system to work in conjunction with the committees so as to strengthen their early
warning capacities. Much work was done in the area of cleaning the municipal drainage system
and repairing major breaches of the La Quinte River that led to significant flooding throughout
Gonaïves in 2004.20

18

Plan d’action national d’adaptation (PANA). (2006). Republique D’Haiti, Ministére de L’Envioronnement.
Retrieved from http://www.adaptationlearning.net/haiti-napa.
19
Growth and poverty reduction strategy paper, 2008 – 2010 (p. 62). (2007). Republic of Haiti. Retrieved from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHAITIINFRENCH/Resources/HaitiDSNCRPEnglish.pdf.
20
Tropical storm recovery program: tropical storm Jeanne September 17-18, 2004. (2005). USAID. Retrieved from
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACF334.pdf.
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When water engulfed the city once more in 2008, the international aid community
increased its level of activity to reduce the amount of flooding in Gonaïves and to make the
residents of the city more resilient. Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) International has
built three major canals and 15,530 linear meters of drainage canals with USAID funds in
Gonaïves.21 Work was also focused on unclogging and connecting canals and drains throughout
the city. Major emphasis was placed on dredging, enlarging, and reinforcing the riverbanks of
the La Quinte River, which contributed to 60 percent of the flooding in 2004. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) built or rehabilitated 26 schools throughout the city, either
relocating them to higher ground away from areas of significant flooding or adding additional
floors so that they could also serve as hurricane shelters.22 Besides IOM, USAID and Save the
Children worked with children, parents, and teachers in 20 schools around Gonaïves to increase
best practices in disaster preparedness, mitigation, and management. This involved forming
school emergency response groups that developed and implemented disaster preparedness plans
and conducted hazard and vulnerability assessments for their schools. USAID also collaborated
with civil protection officials in the Artibonite Department, the department in which Gonaïves is
situated, to implement the Programme d’Urgence et de Gestion de Risques et Désastres
(PURGD), which focused on developing and updating local risk maps, conducting disaster drills,
and supporting local and national government officials in risk mitigation projects.23 It was this
concerted effort that ensured that the level of death and destruction that occurred in 2004 would
not again be witnessed throughout the region.
21

Working to protect their city—hurricane protection success in Gonaïves, Haiti. (2010). CHF International.
Retrieved from http://chfinternational.org/node/34549.
22
Charles, J. (2010). In Haiti flood zone, there’s worry amid the work. The Miami Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/15/1680753/in-a-flood-zone-theres-worry-amid.html.
23
Latin America and the Caribbean—disaster risk reduction fact sheet #1, fiscal year 2010. (2010). USAID.
Retrieved from
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/prep_mit/mods/program_
updates/lac_drr_fs01_09-30-2010.pdf.
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DRR Hampered by Reality of Political Fragmentation
Some have argued that while Haiti had taken some positive steps forward in dealing with
its disaster risks, the country’s history of chronic political upheaval left its institutions far too
weak to sustain any long-term initiatives. This has been particularly true in the case of disaster
risk reduction. The tremendous destruction wrought upon Haiti in 2004 during hurricane Jeanne
occurred only months after the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was driven out of
power by an armed insurgency, plunging the country in civil war. So in 2004 Haiti was dealing
with significant political dislocation and the stalling of its newfound democratic tradition when it
was faced with natural disaster. Many of the administrations that came to power simply did not
have the time necessary to develop, coordinate, monitor, and evaluate DRR policy. This required
a level of stability not evident in Haiti, perhaps ever. Political strife often left the government of
Haiti in a position where it could only react to disasters when they occurred rather than be able to
address the root causes of disaster in a comprehensive manner.24
The period following Hurricane Jeanne in 2004 had not been the first time that the
government of Haiti, with the assistance of the international community, had established plans
and policies to address Haiti’s vulnerabilities to natural disaster. In 1999 it declared the National
Environment Action Plan (NEAP) with the support of the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), USAID, the World Bank, and UNDP. This plan included the sustainable
management of environmentally protected areas and watersheds. A year later, the country’s
National Risk and Disaster Plan was established to address the causes of risk, to reduce the
impact of disasters, and to strengthen response capacities. Four years after this plan was

24

Disaster risk management programs for priority countries (p. 136). (2009). The World Bank. Retrieved from
http://www.gfdrr.org/docs/6thCG_DRM_Programs_for_Priority_Countries.pdf.
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established, hurricane Jeanne devastated large segments of the country, highlighting the lack of
progress on a number of these stated objectives.25
The DPC was characterized as rather weak prior to the 2004 disaster, evident from its
inability to effectively coordinate the massive international relief effort that emerged. Disaster
coordination was predominately done by the international aid community, leaving Haitian
government institutions mostly marginalized.26 It has been argued that excessive centralization of
decision-making within the national government prevented the DPC from exercising the
autonomy it needed to effectively work with policy makers in other government institutions,
donor agencies, and the United Nations, and thus to adequately serve as the lead entity in disaster
response and recovery.27 Some view this as a result of the various rivalries that existed between
government agencies. In Haiti, environmental policy is often dealt with across a multitude of
government agencies, each handling a different aspect of an issue. Disaster policy, subsumed
within environmental policy, thus becomes the purview of many different and competing
government agencies. In a country like Haiti where clientelism dominates politics and policy
making, DRR initiatives, multifaceted by nature, become hampered by a number of turf wars.28
Though the response of Haitian government institutions and the international community
improved in 2008 when compared to failures in 2004, many problems persisted. Many were
critical of what they felt was a lack of policy commitment by the Haitian administration in power
at the time. The National Disaster Management Committee, part of the NDRMS, failed to meet
25

Eliscar, J. (2010). Environmental and Natural Disasters in Haiti: The Impacts of Failed Policies From 2004 to
2010 (pp 32 – 34). Graduate Masters Theses. Paper 32. http://scholarworks.umb.edu/masters_theses/32.
26
Amin, S., & Goldstein, M. (Eds.). (2008). Data against natural disasters: establishing effective systems for relief,
recovery, and reconstruction (p. 109). The World Bank. Retrieved from PreventionWeb
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7943_97808213745281.pdf.
27
Amin, S., & Goldstein, M. (Eds.). (2008). Data against natural disasters: establishing effective systems for relief,
recovery, and reconstruction (p. 105). The World Bank. Retrieved from PreventionWeb
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7943_97808213745281.pdf.
28
Eliscar, J. (2010). Environmental and Natural Disasters in Haiti: The Impacts of Failed Policies From 2004 to
2010 (pp 32 – 34). Graduate Masters Theses. Paper 32. http://scholarworks.umb.edu/masters_theses/32.
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formally all throughout 2005-2006, and most of the ministries attached to the committee did not
actively work to institutionalize and develop the body.29 The U.S. Southern Command
(Southcom) responsible for security operations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
launched similar complaints when the slew of hurricanes hit the country in 2008. They blamed
the Haitian government for failing to grant Southcom title to land for an Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) and a Disaster Relief Warehouse (DRW) for which funding had been approved
years prior to the four major storms in 2008.30 While many more lives were saved in 2008,
flooding and mudslides were significant, and a sizable segment of the population was left
without much needed relief for days.

The Hurricane Season Following the 2010 Earthquake
Immediately following the 2010 January earthquake, the anticipation of the rainy season
in May, and the hurricane season right on its heels, put the international aid community on the
defensive. Now they were rushing to prevent another tragedy on top of the one they were already
struggling to manage. While for the past decade or so droves of Haitians had been leaving the
city of Gonaïves for what seemed to be the comparative safety of the capital city, the
earthquake’s devastation of Port-au-Prince dramatically reversed this trend. Anywhere between
50,000 to 100,000 Haitians from the capital were now dispersed throughout the Gonaïves area
just months before the threat of flash floods and mudslides potentially became a reality.31 Not
only in Gonaïves, but also throughout the country, relief camps housing the displaced were
29

Amin, S., & Goldstein, M. (Eds.). (2008). Data against natural disasters: establishing effective systems for relief,
recovery, and reconstruction (p. 103). The World Bank. Retrieved from PreventionWeb
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7943_97808213745281.pdf.
30
Kathie Klarreich. (2008). Haiti gets no mercy from Hanna, Ike. Time. Retrieved from
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1839710,00.html.
31
Many Haitians leave quake zone for flood zone. (2010). Associated Press. Retrieved from
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35048770/ns/world_news-haiti/.
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particularly vulnerable. Just prior to the rainy season, there were nearly 1.2 million people in 460
spontaneously organized camps, with 250,000 living in 21 camps facing significant risks. The
government conducted site assessments for risk of flooding and hurricane exposure, evacuating
inhabitants of the most at-risk camps immediately. Over 7,000 of the most vulnerable were
relocated, while mitigation work was started in at-risk sites.32
The Red Cross was particularly active in working with local communities to address the
flood risks presented by the impending wet season. The organization conducted disaster
preparedness activities in relief camps throughout the country, training volunteers in emergency
first-aid, vulnerability and capacity assessment and community-based disaster management,
while sponsoring community groups active in digging drainage ditches, laying sandbags on
hillsides, and creating evacuation routes in vulnerable areas. Other organizations used cash-forwork programs to rehabilitate drainage canals and build flood barriers. The Red Cross was also
instrumental in launching an awareness campaign prior to the hurricane season, sending
approximately 4 million text messages, running weekly national radio programs, and using sound
trucks to disseminate information on preparing for floods, storms, and landslides.33 Two
emergency hotlines were established, one in Creole and another for French and English speakers,
connecting relief camp managers to Critical Incident Response Teams established by the IOM,
MINUSTAH, and OCHA. If camps faced significant flooding, these teams would be responsible
for outlining response options, and relocating affected populations if necessary. Emergency food

32

Action plan for national recovery and development of Haiti: immediate key initiatives for the future (p. 32).
(2010). Government of the Republic of Haiti. Retrieved from
http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/events/documents/event-725-2.pdf.
33
Haiti earthquake 2010: One-year progress report (p. 19-20). (2010). IFRC. Retrieved from
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/208400First%20anniversary%20Haiti%20EQ%20operation%20report_16b.pdf.
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rations were pre-positioned in 31 locations across the country, with alternative transport routes
established to avoid areas potentially vulnerable to mudslides.34
The United States government was also significant in the preparation for the 2010
hurricane season. Since the earthquake destroyed Haiti’s Meteorological Center, leaving the
country without the real-time weather information necessary for preparedness and early warning
activities, USAID facilitated the shipment of two emergency weather information network
systems to Haiti. USAID, working with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the
U.S. National Weather Service, Meteo-France, and the Hydrologic Research Center (HRC), also
began work to establish a flash flood guidance system that would monitor inundation patterns
and issue warnings to at-risk populations.35 Another primary focus of U.S. activity in Haiti was
to build the capacity of the country’s emergency response network. It has worked extensively
with the Haitian Department of Civil Protection, funding the construction of five emergency
operations centers and five disaster relief warehouses throughout the country.36
Despite the multiple measures to prepare the earthquake ravaged country for the
impending hurricane season, a 30-minute storm that hit Port-au-Prince in September made it
apparent that the relief camps were not ready for a full-blown tropical storm or hurricane. Nearly
15,000 tents in 262 camps were either damaged or completely destroyed in the short

34

Responding to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti: achievements, challenges and lessons to be learned (p. 20). (2010).
Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Retrieved from
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-news-newsdetails&newsid=143.
35
Latin America and the Caribbean—Disaster Risk Reduction, Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. (2010).
USAID. Retrieved from
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/prep_mit/mods/program_
updates/lac_drr_fs01_09-30-2010.pdf.
36
Press briefing by Kenneth Merten, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Haiti, and Carleene Dei, USAID/Haiti
Mission Director—Haiti’s Hurricane Preparedness. (2010). USAID. Retrieved from
http://reliefweb.int/node/368045.
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maelstrom.37 Immediately after the earthquake it was understood that the relief effort would have
to consist of providing the type of relief shelters that could withstand the heavy rain and winds of
the tropical storm season. Since this could not be accomplished before the hurricane season was
upon the country, much of the international community’s efforts were concentrated on
preparedness and educating the population on how to respond if a hurricane should occur.38
Reports following the storm found that camps that had worked closely with the international
community in implementing some forms of mitigation such as digging drainage channels and
ensuring tents and tarpaulins were secure, were less affected by the violent storm. The event led
the international relief effort to intensify its work in these areas. Over 180 assessments of camps
facing flood and landslide risks were carried out, with 109 of those determined to be of high risk
marked for extensive mitigation work.39
When Hurricane Tomas passed through the country on Friday November 5th, things were
not nearly as dire as they had been in 2004 and 2008 despite the heightened vulnerability of the
population following the January earthquake. Only seven people were killed, while another
10,000 voluntarily evacuated their homes in search of safer locations.40 Specifically impressive
was the fact that there were no deaths in Gonaïves, the Haitian city most associated with the
devastations of hurricanes past. Organizations like CHF International point to their work planting
over 230,000 trees and building over 100,000 cubic meters of dry-stone wall to prevent soil
erosion and mudslides, construction of over 15,500 linear meters of drainage canals, and
expansion of a nearby artificial lake to hold larger quantities of water, as significant in
37

Increased disaster planning key in Haiti following storm. (2010). UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/node/369414.
38
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preventing devastation this time around.41 USAID pointed to its dredging and reinforcement of
the La Quinte river, which was the source of much of the flood water that inundated the city in
previous years, while Haiti’s DPC believed that lives were saved as a result of its early warning
and evacuation notices.
Others were more skeptical of such claims. They argued that catastrophe was avoided
because the Hurricane simply did not hit Haiti directly on. The level of rain and wind was not
what it had been in previous large storms. These same voices were actually quite critical of the
country’s preparedness. They point to reports of shortages in shelter material and other essential
emergency items, the reluctance of much of the population living in tent cities around the
country to evacuate out of fear of having their belongings stolen or land expropriated by the
more powerful, calls by the government to evacuate at-risk locations without telling the
population where to go, and evacuations to what ended up being locations prone to flooding
despite statements to the contrary by the Haitian government and international community.42 The
lack of places to relocate vulnerable populations should the threat of a hurricane emerge was
something acknowledged earlier on by U.S. government organizations working in the country.
Most of the country’s hurricane shelters were left unusable by the January earthquake.43 One of
the objectives identified by the international relief effort moving forward was to reconstruct or
modify schools and hospitals so that they would serve as safe zones in times of disaster.44
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While disaster was averted in this case, greater dangers may be on the horizon,
particularly in terms of landslides. A USAID team of seismologists and geologists found nearly
5,000 landslides produced by the January earthquake, and predict the possibility of many more
during future rainy seasons.45 These potential landslides may not only be devastating to the
communities below them as trees, rocks, and boulders descend upon their homes, but also as this
sediment and debris interrupts river flows and thus increases the magnitude of future flooding.46
This is an example of the earthquake magnifying some of Haiti’s more traditional risks. Because
Haiti is one of the most deforested nations in the western hemisphere, in many areas water is not
seeping into the soil where it is absorbed, but rather erodes unstable slopes producing landslides
and massive floods.47 In fact, the death toll and massive destruction caused by Jeanne in 2004
was not a result of wind-damage, but rather the mudslides and flooding due to its heavy rains.48
Both the Haitian government and various international organizations have identified the
need to address Haiti’s environmental degradation as one central component in reducing its risks
to disaster. In the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment conducted following the earthquake, the
Haitian government identified the protection of the country’s ecosystem as critical to reducing
disaster risks. It pointed to soil stabilization by reforestation as a first step forward,49 along with
sustainable watershed management and sustainable farming. Some agricultural practices have
lead to a reduction in forest coverage, reducing soil quality and thus increasing erosion,
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increasing the rate and scale of flooding, destroying existing economic activities including
agriculture.50 Just a few months before the earthquake, the Inter-American Development Bank
approved a $3.44 million grant to help Haiti implement sustainable land and forest management
practices, and another $30 million for anti-flooding works in three major watersheds and the
promotion of erosion control agricultural practices. The hope is to reduce flooding by 20 percent
in these three watersheds and increase permanent plant covering by 20 percent.51

Addressing Vulnerability to Seismic Activity
While the January earthquake was the first of its kind experienced by the country in over
two hundred years, Haiti’s geographic location makes it highly vulnerable to seismic activity.
Two of the country’s primary urban centers are located on major fault lines, the EnriquilloPlantain Garden fault responsible for the recent tragedy running near Port-au-Prince, and the
Septentrional fault running off the northern coast near Cap-Haïtien, Haiti’s second city.52 Other
significant provincial cities such as Les Cayes, Jacmel, Léogâne, Fort Liberté, and Ouanaminthe
are also potentially threatened. Despite such exposure, Haitians simply never considered
earthquakes an impending threat. The country had not faced one in over two centuries.
Hurricanes were a much more frequent and thus familiar menace, and anxieties regarding
underdevelopment, endemic poverty, and political instability were seemingly more pressing.
These same belief structures shaped the relationship between Haiti and the international aid
community. Thus little was invested in establishing a system to monitor seismic activity, even
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after Haitian seismologist Claude Prépetit’s 2009 research found that Haiti was at risk of an
earthquake of a magnitude similar to the one that occurred in January.53 In March, following the
quake, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sent seismologists and
geologists from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) into Haiti to set up eight seismic stations,
five of which will become part of a permanent National Haiti Seismic Network. With data
gathered from the earthquake’s aftershocks they were able to gain a better understanding of the
fault that produced the massive tremor and develop a more detailed and accurate national seismic
hazard map. These advances were complimented by workshops with scientists throughout the
region to improve their understanding of seismic risks and thus enhance their national
resiliency.54
Haiti’s lack of awareness of the threat that earthquakes posed has also translated into an
absence of modern building codes. The 2008 collapse of a hillside school on the outskirts of
Port-au-Prince killing over 90 children, in hindsight, was a foreshadowing of the devastation to
come only two years later. The school was built without any structural steel or cement.55
According to the San Francisco-based nonprofit design group, Architecture for Humanity,
Haiti’s legacy of widespread deforestation has meant that construction is primarily done with
poured concrete and cement blocks, but that because concrete is expensive, many contractors add
greater quantities of sand to their mixtures, producing structurally weaker material that easily
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crumbles under stress. The lack of steel reinforcement is also a result of costs. Even the concrete
blocks used are of substandard quality, often made in people’s private homes.56
Port-au-Prince itself invites disaster. It lies along steep hillside slopes and atop soil that is
not meant to sustain much development.57 In the past couple of decades, the capital has grown
dramatically from about 250,000 in the 1950s to over 2 million recently, all without government
management.58 Grinding poverty and the absence of government oversight has meant that the
majority of this new population built where, how, and with whatever they could, without
considering the risks they were subjecting themselves to.59 So the devastation wrought on
January 12, 2010 was a byproduct of the intersection of endemic poverty, seismic risk, and
anemic government capacity.
While the document Urban Disasters—Lessons from Haiti calls for long-term DRR to be
a vital component of the post-disaster relief and recovery effort so as to avoid building back with
the same mistakes as before, it also acknowledges that government incapacity makes this
objective rather daunting. “There [simply] is no policy environment to even start working on
these concerns. In the absence of clear government guidelines, building codes, byelaws and
zoning regulations there is no common agreed denominator for initiating a widespread safe
construction campaign.”60 An indicator of Haiti’s inability to address its seismic risk is the fact
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that the country only has one earthquake engineer.61 Even more problematic is the possibility
that a safe building campaign may be preempted by people’s urgent desire to put things back
together as they were before the earthquake, even if that means reestablishing old risks. It has
been noted that families that were capable of rebuilding started immediately after the disaster in
order to secure their property rights, considering the various issues regarding the lack of reliable
government records of land titles. Much of this reconstruction is being done as it had always
been done. While some international entities operating in Haiti, such as the British Red Cross
(BRC), have begun training people on how to build seismic resistant homes, the scale at which
this needs to be done does not yet exist. An effective campaign would require more time,
resources, and greater government involvement, luxuries that may not exist at the moment.62
The issues surrounding reconstruction do not just involve how to rebuild, but also where
to rebuild. This debate has led to two distinct positions. The first perspective focuses on
minimizing the level of social dislocation as much as possible by keeping people as near to their
places of origin as possible and helping them reinforce homes that are salvageable. Those who
embrace this point-of-view have been highly critical of the Haitian government and much of the
international relief effort’s shelter provision strategy. Following the earthquake, nearly 1,200
spontaneous camps sprouted in and around Port-au-Prince. Many were overcrowded, had poor
sanitation facilities, and were in areas subject to flooding and mudslides during the rainy
season.63 This prompted the government and international agencies to begin relocating many
families to planned camps outside of high-risk areas, which meant relocation far from Port-au61
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Prince where the services and jobs exist. Critics fear that these planned camps are creating a
situation of perpetual dependency, and are potential sites of future slums.64 Despite these
reservations, plans are to build 125,000 temporary shelters in these camps by the summer of
2011. Part of the reason why efforts have been concentrated in these areas rather than in Port-auPrince is due to issues concerning unclear land rights and the massive quantities of rubble, nearly
20 million cubic meters, that litter the capital.65 Unfortunately these difficult problems may take
many years, if not decades, to resolve.
In the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery’s (GFDRR) document Haiti
Earthquake Reconstruction, emphasis is placed on the need for recovery efforts to consider the
factors that lead people to live in vulnerable locations. The document advocates for shelters
being built as close to peoples’ previous homes as possible so as to help them preserve
community ties, secure their land rights, and maintain proximity to previous livelihoods. It is
believed that this will increase the likelihood of a seamless transition between temporary shelter
and permanent housing.66 It is also argued that adopting such a strategy stimulates self-help,
reducing the costs of reconstruction, and speeding up the return to some semblance of
normalcy.67 UN-Habitat, which focuses exclusively on urban issues, is aligned with this
perspective, and thus promotes a strategy of ‘Safe return,’ whereby people are assisted in
returning to their places of origin, these sites are assessed for risks, and made safer through
64
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appropriate repairs and urban planning.68 USAID has played an important role in appraising
buildings in affected areas, supporting the assessment of over 380,000 of 400,000 targeted
structures. About 54 percent of these buildings have been marked green and thus safe to inhabit,
26 marked yellow, needing minor repair, and 20 percent marked red, requiring major repairs or
demolition.69 Jeff Kerzner of the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) believes that
efforts should be concentrated on helping people move back into homes that can be repaired
rather than building unsustainable temporary shelters far from the capital. He contends that
repairs can be made to the majority of these properties for around $1,300 each, which is
comparable to the price of a temporary shelter. Therefore, he believes investing in the provision
of temporary shelters is a waste of time and money, and potentially presents long-term
problems.70
For those who advocate for this perspective, UNDP’s work developing a map of
seismically vulnerable areas of Port-au-Prince is critical in the process of building back better.
This seismic zoning map addresses the intensity of shaking a tremor may produce as well as the
soil types around the city and their reactions under various levels of stress. This information will
be crucial in the work of the architects and engineers designing safer buildings and infrastructure
throughout the city. The seismic zoning map will be further enhanced in a more detailed version
to be completed by mid-2012.”71
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A second perspective goes beyond simply advocating for the establishment of temporary
shelters away from the hazards of Port-au-Prince, but that Port-au-Prince should not be rebuilt in
its current location at all. They argue that, not only is the current location of the capital near a
major seismic fault, but that the majority of its buildings are on unstable hillsides, and that it lies
atop soft soils in a flood basin subject to storm surges. They propose the capital be moved to the
city of Hinche in the Haut Artibonite Valley 128 km to the North of Port-au-Prince. It is
seismically stable, has good water resources, and adequate area for building. They point to
successful cases of relocation in other countries, such as the relocations of Guatemala’s capital
from Antigua to Guatemala City and Costa Rica’s from Cartago to San Jose after earthquakes
destroyed both in 1773 and 1841 respectively.72
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SOURCE: USGS | GENE THORP AND BONNIE BERKOWITZ / THE WASHINGTON
POST73
There are others who don’t call for complete relocation, but do view the tragedy of the
earthquake as an opportunity to correct what they view as an unsustainable concentration of
political and economic activity in Port-au-Prince.74 Over 65% of economic activity and 85% of
fiscal revenue is located in the city. They believe that this concentration of government and
private sector resources, services, and job opportunities leaves the country highly vulnerable.
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Devolution of power to the provinces and municipalities is a forcefully stated priority in the
Haitian government’s Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti.75
It calls for investing in other economic and population centers such as Cap Haïtien, Les
Gonaïves, St-Marc, Hinche, and Les Cayes for both historical and comparative advantage
reasons.76 The fleeing of over 500,000 people away from Port-au-Prince to these secondary cities
and towns is viewed as an opportunity. The government plans on using grants to provide an
incentive for this displaced population to remain around what they hope to turn into new growth
hubs. They are also outlining plans for the development of regional infrastructures and services
outside of Port-au-Prince, with the objective of spurring economic expansion in these areas and
strengthening local capacity.77

Underdevelopment, Political Instability, and Risk
More recently, efforts in Haiti have sought to address disaster risks in a comprehensive
manner, particularly as it becomes clear that there are significant links between economic
underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and hydrometeorological and seismic risk. Any
effort to reduce risk in Haiti must begin with the fact that 77% of the population lives on less
than US$2 a day. It is the desperation that results from this fact that leads many Haitians to live
with multiple risks. If we look at the degree of environmental degradation, particularly
deforestation, that characterizes the island, poverty is a central factor. According to USAID,
seventy-one percent of the fuel used for cooking in Haiti comes from the few trees left in the
country, either burned directly or after being turned into charcoal, amounting to the equivalent of
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30 million trees a year.78 For many of the country’s unemployed, selling charcoal is one means to
eke out some kind of living, while for others too poor to afford electricity or imported fuels,
charcoal becomes the only option for cooking. So actions taken out of economic necessity,
become factors in increasing the population’s vulnerability to disaster, thus making their
economic circumstances even more despairing. The lack of trees has also dramatically affected
farmers. As trees were cut down for fuel, the topsoil once held by their roots was inevitably
washed away by heavy rains. This, along with drier weather as a result of the tree loss, made
growing crops impossible. Unable to make a living in agriculture, many Haitians migrated to
Port-au-Prince to pursue new economic opportunities. Recently Haiti’s rate of urban population
growth was at 3.63 percent a year compared to 0.92 percent in the countryside, with nearly a
quarter of the country’s entire population living in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.79 Much
of this population either lived in shantytowns in flood plains, or on unstable hillsides vulnerable
to landslide, in homes constructed with cheap materials that cannot withstand the force of
earthquakes or hurricanes. Compound this situation of a highly vulnerable population and a
multitude of hazard risks with political instability and social dislocation, and you have a country
that is always on the precipice of major catastrophe. Only by strengthening government
institutions, empowering Haiti’s civil society, and bridging the gap between the two, will the
country be able to even begin to address these factors contributing to its vulnerability to disaster.
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